Game Theory Part 2, Chapter 4

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Overview

- Selfish Caching
- Nash Equilibrium
- Price of Anarchy
- Rock Paper Scissor
- Mechanism Design

Selfish Peers

- Peers may not try to destroy the system, instead they may try to benefit from the system without contributing anything
- Such selfish behavior is called free riding or freeloading
- Free riding is a common problem in file sharing applications:
- Studies show that most users in the P2P file sharing networks do not want to provide anything
- Protocols that are supposed to be "incentive-compatible", such as BitTorrent, can also be exploited
 - The BitThief client downloads without uploading!



Game Theory


- Game theory attempts to mathematically capture behavior in strategic situations (games), in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others.
- "Game theory is a sort of umbrella or 'unified field' theory for the rational side of social science, where 'social' is interpreted broadly, to include human as well as non-human players (computers, animals, plants)" [Aumann 1987]



game theory


Selfish Caching

- P2P system where node i experiences a demand w_i for a certain file.
 - Setting can be extended to multiple files
- A node can either
 - cache the file for cost α , or
 - get the file from the nearest node l(i) that caches it for cost $w_i \cdot d_{i,l(i)}$
- Example: $\alpha = 4$, $w_i = 1$



Social Optimum & Nash Equilibrium

- In game theory, the "best" configurations are called social optima
 - A social optimum maximizes the social welfare



- A strategy profile is the set of strategies chosen by the players
- "Stable" configurations are called (Nash) Equilibria


Definition

A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile for which nobody can improve by unilaterally changing its strategy

• Systems are assumed to magically converge towards a NE


Selfish Caching: Example 2

- Which are the social optima, and the Nash Equilibria in the following example?
 - $\alpha = 4$



- Nash Equilibrium \Leftrightarrow Social optimum
- Does every game have
 - a social optimum?
 - a Nash equilibrium?


Selfish Caching: Equilibria




Proof by construction:

- The following procedure always finds a Nash equilibrium
 - 1. Put a node y with highest demand into caching set
 - **2.** Remove all nodes *z* for which $d_{zy}w_z < \alpha$
 - 3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 until no nodes left
- The strategy profile where all nodes in the caching set cache the file, and all others chose to access the file remotely, is a Nash equilibrium.


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
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
⁻ Does NE condition hold for every node?

Proof


- If node x not in the caching set
 - Exists *y* for which $w_x d_{xy} < \alpha$
 - No incentive to cache because remote access cost $w_x d_{xy}$ are smaller than placement cost α
- If node *x* is in the caching set
 - For any other node *y* in the caching set:
 - Case 1: y was added to the caching set before x
 - It holds that $w_x d_{xy} \ge \alpha$ due to the construction
 - Case 2: y was added to the caching set after x
 - It holds that $w_x \ge w_y$, and $w_y d_{yx} \ge \alpha$ due to the construction
 - Therefore $w_x d_{xy} \ge w_y d_{yx} \ge \alpha$
 - x has no incentive to stop caching because all other caching nodes are too far away, i.e., the remote access cost are larger than α

Price of Anarchy (PoA)

- With selfish nodes any caching system converges to a stable equilibrium state
 - Unfortunately, NEs are often not optimal!



- Idea:
 - Quantify loss due to selfishness by comparing the performance of a system at Nash equilibrium to its optimal performance
 - Since a game can have more than one NE it makes sense to define a worst-case
 Price of Anarchy (PoA), and an optimistic Price of Anarchy (OPoA)




- $PoA \ge OPoA \ge 1$
- A *PoA* close to 1 indicates that a system is insusceptible to selfish behavior

PoA for Selfish Caching


• How large is the (optimistic) price of anarchy in the following examples?

1)
$$\alpha = 4$$
, $w_i = 1$

2) α = 4




3) $\alpha = 101$




PoA for Selfish Caching with constant demand and distances

- PoA depends on demands, distances, and the topology
- If all demands and distances are equal (e.g. $w_i = 1$, $d_{ij} = 1$) ...
 - How large can the PoA grow in cliques?




- How large can the PoA grow on a star?



– How large can PoA grow in an arbitrary topology?


PoA for Selfish Caching with constant demand

- PoA depends on demands, distances, and the topology
- Price of anarchy for selfish caching can be linear in the number of nodes even when all nodes have the same demand ($w_i = 1$)




Another Example: Braess' Paradox

- Flow of 1000 cars per hour from A to D
- Drivers decide on route based on current traffic
- Social Optimum? Nash Equilibrium? PoA?



• Is there always a Nash equilibrium?


Rock Paper Scissors



- Which is the best action: (), (), or ??
- What is the social optimum? What is the Nash Equilibrium?
- Any good strategies?

Mixed Nash Equilibria

- Answer: Randomize !
 - Mix between pure strategies. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over pure strategies.
 - Can you beat the following strategy in expectation? (p[] = 1/2, p[] = 1/4, p[] = 1/4)
 - The only (mixed) Nash Equilibrium is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
 - Rock Paper Scissors is a so-called Zero-sum game



Theorem [Nash 1950]

Every game has a mixed Nash equilibrium

Solution Concepts

• A solution concept predicts how a game turns out

Definition


A solution concept is a rule that maps games to a set of possible outcomes, or to a probability distribution over the outcomes

- The Nash equilibrium as a solution concept predicts that any game ends up in a strategy profile where nobody can improve unilaterally.
 If a game has multiple NEs, then the game ends up in any of them.
- Other solution concepts:
 - Dominant strategies
 - A game ends up in any strategy profile where all players play a dominant strategy, given that the game has such a strategy profile
 - A strategy is dominant if, regardless of what any other players do, the strategy earns a player a larger payoff than any other strategy.
 - There are more, e.g. correlated equilibrium

Prisoner's Dilemma

- One of the most famous games in game theory is the so called Prisoner's Dilemma
 - Two criminals A and B are charged with a crime, but only circumstantial evidence exists
 - Both can cooperate (C), i.e., stay silent or they can defect (D), i.e., talk to the police and admit their crime
 - If both cooperate, each of them has to go to prison for one year
 - If both defect, each of them has to go to prison for three years
 - If only A defects but B chooses to cooperate, A is a crown witness and does not have to serve jail time but B gets three years (and vice versa)

• Dominant strategy is to defect



How can Game Theory help?

- Economy
 - Understand markets?
 - Predict economy crashes?
 - Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economics ("Nobel Prize") has been awarded many times to game theorists
- Problems
 - GT models the real world inaccurately
 - Many real world problems are too complex to capture by a game
 - Human beings are not really rational
- GT in computer science
 - Players are not exactly human
 - Explain unexpected deficiencies (emule, bittorrent etc.)
 - Additional measurement tool to evaluate distributed systems

Mechanism Design

- Game Theory describes existing systems
 - Explains, or predicts behavior through solution concepts (e.g. Nash Equilibrium)
- Mechanism Design creates games in which it is best for an agent to behave as desired by the designer
 - incentive compatible systems
 - Most popular solution concept: dominant strategies
 - Sometimes Nash equilibrium
 - Natural design goals
 - Maximize social welfare
 - Maximize system perfomance

Mechanism design ≈ "inverse" game theory


Incentives

- How can a mechanism designer change the incentive structure?
 - Offer rewards, or punishments for certain actions
 - Money, better QoS
 - Emprisonment, fines, worse QoS
 - Change the options available to the players
 - Example: fair cake sharing (MD for parents)




Selfish Caching with Payments

- Designer enables nodes to reward each other with payments
- Nodes offer bids to other nodes for caching
 - Nodes decide whether to cache or not after all bids are made




- OPoA = 1
- However, *PoA* at least as bad as in the basic game



Selfish Caching: Volunteer Dilemma

- Clique
 - Constant distances $d_{ij} = 1$
 - Variable demands $1 < w_i < \alpha = 20$
- Who goes first?
 - Node with highest demand?
 - How does the situation change if the demands are not public knowledge, and nodes can lie when announcing their demand?




First-Price Auction

- Mechanism Designer
 - Wants to minimize social cost
 - Is willing to pay money for a good solution
 - Does not know demands w_i


Idea: Hold an auction


- Auction should generate competition among nodes. Thus get a good deal.
- Nodes place private bids b_i. A bid b_i represents the minimal payment for which node *i* is willing to cache.
- Auctioneer accepts lowest offer. Pays $b_{min} = \min_{i} b_i$ to the bidder of b_{min} .
- What should node *i* bid?
 - $-\alpha w_i \leq b_i$
 - i does not know other nodes' bids



Second-Price Auction

- The auctioneer chooses the node with the lowest offer, but pays the price of the second lowest bid!
- What should *i* bid?
 - Truthful ($b_i = \alpha w_i$), overbid, or underbid?





Proof


- Let $v_i = \alpha w_i$. Let $b_{min} = \min_{j \neq i} b_j$.
- The payoff for *i* is $b_{min} v_i$ if $b_i < b_{min}$, and 0 otherwise.
- "truthful dominates underbidding"
 - If $b_{min} > v_i$ then both strategies win, and yield the same payoff.
 - If $b_{min} < b_i$ then both strategies lose.
 - If $b_i < b_{min} < v_i$ then underbidding wins the auction, but the payoff is negative. Truthful bidding loses, and yields a payoff of 0.
 - Truthful bidding is never worse, but in some cases better than underbidding.
- "truthful dominates overbidding"
 - If $b_{min} > b_i$ then both strategies win and yield the same payoff
 - If $b_{min} < v_i$ then both strategies lose.
 - If $v_i < b_{min} < b_i$ then truthful bidding wins, and yields a positive payoff. Overbidding loses, and yields a payoff of 0.
 - Truthful bidding is never worse, but in some cases better than overbidding.
- Hence truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for all nodes *i*.

Another Approach: 0-implementation

Theorem

- A third party can implement a strategy profile by offering high enough "insurances"
 - A mechanism implements a strategy profile S if it makes all strategies in S dominant.
- Mechanism Designer publicly offers the following deal to all nodes except to the one with highest demand, p_{max} :
 - "If nobody choses to cache I will pay you a millinillion."
- Assuming that a millinillion compensates for not being able to access the file, how does the game turn out?

Any Nash equilibrium can be implemented for free



MD for P2P file sharing

- Gnutella, Napster etc. allow easy free-riding
- BitTorrent suggests that peers offer better QoS (upload speed) to collaborative peers
 - However, it can also be exploited
 - The BitThief client downloads without uploading!
 - Always claims to have nothing to trade yet
 - Connects to much more peers than usual clients




- Many techniques have been proposed to limit free riding behavior
 - Tit-for-tat (T4T) trading
 - Allowed fast set (seed capital),
 - Source coding,
 - indirect trading,

increase trading opportunities

- virtual currency...
- Reputation systems
 - shared history

MD in Distributed Systems: Problems

- Virtual currency
 - no trusted mediator
 - Distributed mediator hard to implement
- Reputation systems



- Malicious players
 - Nodes are not only selfish but sometimes Byzantine

Credits

- The concept for a Nash Equilibrium is from John Nash, 1950
- The definition of a Price of Anarchy is from Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999
- The Selfish Caching Game is from Chun, Chaudhuri, Wee, Barreno, Papadimitriou, and Kubiatowicz, 2004
- The Prisoner's Dilemma was first introduced by Flood and Dresher, 1950
- A generalized version of the second-price auction is a VCG auction, introduced by Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves, 1973

That's all, folks!

Questions & Comments?

Roger Wattenhofer